



WAR POWERS AND THE MILLENNIUM 
Paul W. Kahn* 
We live with an eighteenth century constitution in a twenty-first 
century world.  In many areas, we have managed to overcome the 
limits inherent in an anachronistic legal order through judicial inter-
pretation and political accommodation.  When the courts have re-
sisted change too long, failing to adjust legal text to social and politi-
cal reality, they have brought about crises that threatened the 
legitimacy of the entire constitutional order.  This is the lesson of 
Scott v. Sandford1 and of judicial resistance to the New Deal.  Alter-
natively, when judicial interpretations have been guided by a com-
pelling moral vision, we have a sense of the grandeur of the Ameri-
can political mission to realize itself as a country under law.  This is 
the lesson of Brown v. Board of Education,2 and of Reynolds v. 
Simms.3 
Yet, no one thinks it is easy to draw guidance from these differ-
ent perceptions of triumph and disaster in American constitutional 
jurisprudence.  We cannot say that the courts must continually adjust 
the Constitution to contemporary political and moral realities, any 
more than we can say that they must insist on a changeless constitu-
tion.  We cannot say this because we harbor too many divisions over 
our own principles.  We understand that Lochner v. New York4 was 
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no less principled than Brown.5  We cannot be sure in advance how 
the pursuit of a moral vision by the Court will be seen in the long 
run—witness, for example, our current controversies over “color-
blindness” and abortion. 
We have no neutral way out of these conflicts over the path of 
the law because there is no line separating these disagreements over 
the content of the law from deeper conflicts over the nature of the 
rule of law itself.  Our conflicts go directly to the place and meaning 
of law in our common life.  For example, those who hold to an origi-
nalist view of constitutionalism argue from a vision of law that is 
deeply bound up with realizing a common meaning across genera-
tions.  They understand the duties and meaning of citizenship within 
a legal framework that puts at its foundation the idea of maintaining 
the achievements of earlier generations and transmitting them to the 
future.  They thrill to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address where he spoke 
of the achievement of the founding fathers and of the present as a test 
of endurance for the children of that generation; they read Burke on 
political culture as a project in the intergenerational transmission of 
meanings.6  Others, however, see this as rule by the dead hand of the 
past.  They thrill to the ideas of populist democracy.  Still others 
think of our law as the positive expression of a moral vision of rights, 
and of legal interpretation as the effort to realize the full meaning of 
such norms as equality, liberty, and due process.7 
If this is true, we are not going to make much progress in under-
standing the constitutional provisions establishing Congress’s war 
powers simply by adopting one or another interpretive stance.  As in 
most of constitutional law, there is no neutral ground.  Instead, there 
are multiple paths leading to multiple meanings.  We cannot expect 
 
 5. See OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-1910, at 389-
95 (1993). 
 6. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1055-56 (1990); see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 32-35 (1992) (discuss-
ing Lincoln’s understanding of political psychology). 
 7. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 




agreement, when in fact we are proceeding on principles of interpre-
tation that are themselves deeply controverted. 
We should be clear on just how great our principled disagree-
ments in this area are.  We are at that point in our constitutional de-
liberations where the often repeated warning that the Constitution “is 
not a suicide pact”8 confronts an equal and opposite warning that 
“[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional 
power.”9  We are treading very close to ultimate values:  values of 
national survival, on the one hand, and of the meaning of the Ameri-
can political order as a community under law, on the other.  With 
such large stakes, there is a tendency to yield to intuition and moral 
sentiment.  At that point, conflict threatens to become irresolvable. 
If the principles are all controverted and intuition is an inade-
quate ground of interpretation, what is left?  To begin with, we need 
a better description of the setting within which the elaboration of 
American constitutional standards respecting issues of use of force 
takes place today.  This will not tell us what to do with our Constitu-
tion, but it will enable us to understand better what is at stake. 
We are at an extraordinary moment in which there is a funda-
mental competition between our understanding of ourselves as citi-
zens and our understanding of ourselves as moral agents in an 
emerging global order.  This finds expression in a confrontation be-
tween legal orders:  the domestic constitutional order, on the one 
hand, and the international order of human rights, on the other.  This 
conflict, not some unspoken requirements of American hegemony, 
makes this such a troubling and difficult area to think about today.  
But we will never even get to this conflict, if we attempt to interpret 
the meaning of Congress’s war powers by looking only to the ordi-
nary sources of constitutional interpretation:  our text and constitu-
tional structure, our history and legal precedents. 
 
 8. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
 9. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935). 
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I. WAR-DECLARATION:  FROM EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAW TO 
TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICS 
Until well into this century, war was a legitimate means of 
changing entitlements under international law.10  A state could, for 
example, change its borders, its possessions, and its population by 
means of war.  The declaration of war provided notice that such is-
sues were now open; it announced that such basic entitlements were 
about to be “renegotiated” through force of arms.  The declaration, to 
some degree, reflected an increasingly antiquated etiquette of war 
that required respect for an adversary.  More importantly, however, 
the declaration had the function of providing legal notice to third par-
ties, as well as to one’s own citizens, of a change in their legal stand-
ing vis-a-vis others.11  A state at war entered into a new set of legal 
relationships not just with its adversary, but to all other states as well.  
The international law of war was as much about neutrality as about 
the use of force. 
To enter into a state of war was to change the legal rules with 
respect to the law of the sea, the right to use ports, the openness of 
private shipping to search and seizure of contraband, and the right to 
use the territory of third parties.12  Neutral states had rights and obli-
gations with respect to the warring parties.  They had a “procedural” 
right, therefore, to notice that these rules had come into effect.  This 
choice of law function of a declaration was distinguishable from the 
decision to use force.  In this world of classic international law, war 
 
 10. The first formal prohibition on the use of force was the General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War.  See Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. 
 11. Chancellor Kent described this function well, stating it “is essential that 
some formal public act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should 
announce to the people at home their new relations, and duties growing out of 
a state of war, and which should equally apprize neutral nations of the fact.”  
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 55 (2d ed. 1832); see also 
WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1917) (discuss-
ing manifestos and declarations of war between countries). 
 12. For example, Hall devotes some 200 pages to the law of neutrality.  See 
HALL, supra note 11, at 397.  Hannis Taylor also devotes close to 200 pages to 
the same subject.  See HANNIS TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC LAW 617-792 (1901). 
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did not refer to the use of force, but rather to a legal regime.  States at 
war might or might not be engaged in actual fighting at any given 
moment.  Nevertheless, their legal relations to each other and to third 
parties—as well as the relations among the citizens of all these 
states—were determined by a set of rules different from those appli-
cable to states at peace. 
Just as states at war were not necessarily using force against 
each other, states using force were not necessarily at war.  Interna-
tional law included a number of categories collectively called “uses 
of force short of war.”13  For example, a state did not have to enter 
the legal status of war to engage in acts of reprisal, blockade, or self-
defense.14  What distinguished a use of force short of war from war 
itself was the object in view, that is, the end for which force was de-
ployed.  Uses of force short of war were forms of self-help intended 
to enforce existing legal rights; they were limited by this idea of en-
forcing a vested legal right.15  Thus, when British forces preemp-
tively attacked forces on the American side of the Saint Lawrence 
River, which were preparing for an invasion of Canada, both sides 
agreed that acts of self-defense were not acts of war.  They disagreed 
about whether this was a legitimate act of self-defense, but not about 
the category.  Secretary of State Daniel Webster provided what be-
came the classic definition of self-defense:  a government that claims 
self-defense as the justification of a use of force must “‘show a ne-
cessity [that is] . . . instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.’”16 
 
 13. See TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 431. 
 14. See FRITZ KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 3-9 (1971).  By the 
end of the eighteenth century, private reprisals, including the use of “letters of 
marque and reprisals,” were substantially an antiquated form, while public re-
prisals were a growing practice.  See also John Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse 
of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1188-89 
(1999) (discussing Framers’ intent with respect to the marque and reprisal 
clause of the Constitution). 
 15. Compare this idea of law-enforcement to Von Clausewitz’s views on 
the irrelevance of law to war:  “Attached to force are certain self-imposed, im-
perceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law 
and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.”  CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 
577 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1832). 
 16. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 
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Law enforcement was not war.  War sought to change the distri-
bution of legal rights.  In the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
United States engaged in many acts of force short of war, most 
commonly reprisals against groups that were unlikely to respond 
through an organized governmental decision to pursue war.17  The 
predicate for these actions was always a claim of a prior violation of 
an international legal right.  Of course, what began as a limited act of 
law enforcement could become a full-blown war entailing all of the 
legal consequences for third parties.18  And, there was always the un-
resolved conundrum that what looked like law-enforcement to one 
party might look like aggression to the other.19  For this reason, cau-
tion, as well as executive appeals for congressional support, were 
standard aspects of American foreign policy when dealing with na-
tions that could respond with force. 
Thinking about the issue as one of choice of law rather than use 
of force helps us to understand the original framework for the consti-
tutional division of responsibility between the president and Con-
gress.  If to declare war was to move from one international legal or-
der to another, i.e., from the law of peace to the law of war, then 
from the perspective of the sovereign law-making power, the issue 
was one of choice of law.  Congress was the appropriate institutional 
location of that power.  This was simply an extension of Congress’s 
general law-making power. 
Today, the choice of law represented by a declaration of war is 
no longer an available option under international law.  Since the ad-
vent of the United Nations (UN) Charter, war has been abolished as a 
                                                                                                                                      
89 (1938); Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 325 
(1999) (quoting 1841 letter written by United States Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster to British minister Harry Fox). 
 17. See ABRAHAM SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 208-27 (1976). 
 18. For example, the Jefferson administration’s conflict with the Barbary 
powers escalated into an officially declared war.  See id. at 208-16. 
 19. This problem persists to the present day when states act on a contested 
claim of self-defense, as long as the Security Council fails to act under Article 
51.  See Kearley, supra note 16, at 345.  In the Nicaragua case, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) claimed the authority to evaluate a claim to self-
defense.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States), 
1986 I.C.J. 102 (June 27). 
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category of international law.20  A declaration of war serves no pur-
pose under international law; it can have no bearing on the underly-
ing legal situation.  No longer a performative utterance, it is only a 
meaningless utterance—not even descriptive—from the perspective 
of international law.  For example, however one assesses the interna-
tional legality of the United States’ invasion of Panama, the fact that 
Panama had earlier declared war, whereas the United States never 
made such a declaration, is irrelevant to that assessment.21 
War has disappeared from international law because force is no 
longer a legitimate means of changing state entitlements.  The fun-
damental rule of postwar international law was the prohibition on the 
use or threat of force.  This was enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter:  “All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any state . . . .”22  Furthermore, there is a doc-
trine, as well as a supporting practice, of nonrecognition of achieve-
ments gained through force.  Iraq could not change its borders with 
Kuwait through force, Indonesia never received international recog-
nition of its occupation of East Timor, and the Baltic states have re-
verted to their independent status after more than fifty years of occu-
pation by the Soviet Union. 
In place of a law of war, the Charter established a general prohi-
bition on the use of force, along with a narrow set of exceptions.  
These exceptions are limited to:  (1) an act of individual or collective 
self-defense, or (2) a police action authorized by the Security Coun-
cil.23  These exemptions continue the traditional idea that a limited 
use of force to enforce legal rights is not war.24  Under these changed 
legal circumstances, the declaration of war no longer has any bear-
 
 20. See Stephen Neff, Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict: A Proposal for 
A New International Law of Hositility, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 14-15 (1995). 
 21. But see Abraham Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in 
Panama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 284-85  (1991). 
 22. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 23. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 42, 51. 
 24. Because they are law enforcement, not war, the law of neutrality has 
been considered inapplicable with respect to such uses of force.  See Georgios 
Petrochilos, The Relevance of the Concepts of War and Armed Conflict to the 
Law of Neutrality, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575, 580-81 (1998). 
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ing.  War is not an option and self-defense requires no formal decla-
ration. 
The point is not that the choice of law function offers a complete 
account of Congress’s power to declare war.  After all, to declare war 
was to make an extraordinary choice of law.  The declaration had 
substantial implications for domestic politics and citizen rights and 
responsibilities, wholly apart from its implications for the nation’s 
foreign relations.  Yet, the context within which this political deci-
sion was considered was one in which international law required a 
declaration of war, and in which that declaration served a critical 
transnational purpose.  Congress’s power over the budget,25 over 
creation of a standing army and navy,26 over the use of the militia,27 
as well as its power to regulate military forces and to confirm offi-
cers,28 gave it ample power over the military instrument, even with-
out the power to declare war.  All of these powers remain, regardless 
of how we interpret the war declaring provision.  That provision, 
which was originally a vehicle for managing the intersection of the 
domestic political order and the international legal order, today can 
serve only a domestic function. 
The war declaring provision has been reinterpreted within a 
framework of national politics and a theory of democratic legitimacy.  
Its justification now lies not in its choice of law function, but in the 
idea that congressional approval is a necessary condition of a legiti-
mate call for national sacrifice.  We pour into this constitutional pro-
vision our beliefs about the political conditions under which indi-
viduals can be asked to sacrifice their lives and property.  Just as 
there can be no taxation without congressional action, so, the thought 
is, there can be no demand for sacrifice without Congress’s consid-
eration and approval.29  In short, going to war is too important a de-
 
 25. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 26. See id. cls. 12, 13. 
 27. See id. cl. 15. 
 28. See id. cl. 16. 
 29. Joseph Story already made this connection:  “The representatives of the 
people are to lay the taxes to support a war, and therefore have a right to be 
consulted as to its . . . time, and the ways and means of making it effective.”  
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. § 1171 
(5th ed. 1891). 
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cision to be left to the president alone.  This theory of democratic le-
gitimacy is often coupled to a sub-theme of political effectiveness:  a 
deployment of force without prior congressional approval is more 
likely to be undermined by a subsequent withdrawal of congressional 
and popular support.30  These practical arguments, however, are pri-
marily strategic; they apply regardless of the resolution of the consti-
tutional issue.  Whatever the constitutional requirement, it remains 
generally good policy for the president to obtain congressional ap-
proval. 
For two reasons, the war declaring provision has proven to be a 
poor vehicle for realizing this view of the democratic conditions of a 
legitimate use of force.  First, the character of force can no longer be 
cabined within this legal structure.  This is the problem of nuclear 
weapons.  Second, the legal form no longer offers a useful political 
vehicle.  This is a problem of institutional accountability and of the 
structure of congressional decision-making.  In the area of national 
defense, law is inevitably a weak force compared to the risks and 
possibilities created by weapons developments, on the one hand, and 
political processes, on the other.  We are not going to put the country 
at nuclear risk for the sake of an eighteenth century understanding of 
law, and our political institutions are not going to be forced by law to 
make decisions that they perceive as beyond their capacities.  No 
such changes are going to happen without a major effort by the 
courts to enforce a contrary legal rule.31  The courts, however, have 
no more reason than any other politically responsible actor to de-
mand such a change. 
More importantly, this whole approach rests on a misdiagnosis 
of the legitimacy problem with respect to the use of force in the post-
Cold War era.  The problem today is not insufficient attention to 
public opinion in executive decisions to commit military forces.  
Rather, it is just the opposite.  We may already suffer from too much 
democracy and too much attention to domestic politics, in light of 
our responsibilities to a global order of human rights. 
 
 30. See Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF., Win-
ter 1992-93, at 32. 
 31. See JOHN ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS 
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 47-67 (1993). 
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II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
There has been general agreement that the president has consti-
tutional authority to use nuclear weapons in self-defense without 
prior congressional authorization.  Scholars and politicians have 
thought that they have no choice with respect to this issue.  This has 
served as a kind of “reality check” on constitutional interpretation:  
the Constitution could not impose a legal rule that would subject the 
nation to substantial risk of nuclear destruction.  In a MAD (Mutu-
ally Assured Destruction) world, interpretation could be a bit mad.  
That it was a bit mad becomes clear when we consider how much is 
given away in this seemingly uncontroversial step.  Most obviously, 
the president has the power to bring on a world-destroying Arma-
geddon without prior congressional approval.32 
Of course, it has always been true that the president has the au-
thority to respond immediately when self-defense requires it.  This is 
implicit in Webster’s formulation of the test in the Caroline case,33 
which speaks of an “instant, overwhelming” necessity, leaving “no 
moment for deliberation.”34  That test, however, imagined discrete, 
limited actions.  Self-defense would preserve the status quo and thus 
enable congressional deliberation to go forward with respect to the 
larger issues of whether or not to go to war.35  In his correspondence 
concerning the Caroline case, Secretary of State Webster speaks to 
this issue, noting that while the British act was purportedly justified 
on the grounds of self-defense, the act invited the United States to 
consider whether escalation of the affair was appropriate:  “the attack 
 
 32. See Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Dis-
tribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1259-60 
(1991). 
 33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 34. See Jennings, supra note 16, at 89. 
 35. Jefferson provided the classic example of this reasoning in his message 
to Congress on military action with Tripoli: 
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to 
go beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from commit-
ting further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.  The Legislature 
will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offence 
also, they will place our force on an equal footing with that of its ad-
versaries. 
11 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 12 (1802). 
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on the Caroline case is avowed as a national act which may justify 
reprisals, or even general war, if the Government of the United States 
. . . should see fit to decide.”36 
To say that today the president controls the decision whether to 
execute the nuclear threat, or even whether to raise the nuclear threat, 
is to say that the president sets the conditions of life and death for the 
entire nation.  There may be no subsequent moment for congres-
sional deliberation.  This has become the ordinary condition of our 
existence.  In a nuclear age, the lives of all citizens are put at risk in 
the conduct of foreign policy.37  It is no longer a question of foreign 
entanglements subject to the check of congressional control.  We are 
deeply and unavoidably entangled; we live our lives against the 
background risk of nuclear destruction.  Primary responsibility for 
management of that risk lies squarely with the president.  This is the 
political and institutional meaning of the fact that we sit astride thou-
sands of nuclear warheads.  Much as we may try not to think about 
this, recognizing this fact is the only place from which to begin as-
sessing the reality of the war-making power. 
In law, it is not always the case that the greater includes the 
lesser.  Unable to control behavior at the extremes, law may still try 
to control behavior short of the extreme.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
the lesser instances of the use of force, throughout the era of the Cold 
War, were a function of the same ideological confrontation that 
threatened to produce the extreme meant that there was no point out-
side of that conflict from which it was possible to view deployments 
of force.  Every deployment of force was a step in a single, grand 
confrontation.  Hanging over all of the smaller conflicts was the nu-
clear threat.  Thus, the start of the Cold War marked not only the 
start of the nuclear confrontation, but also the commitment to a per-
manent standing army to be deployed by the president in the strategy 
of move and countermove.  There was a single policy of national de-
fense that extended directly from nuclear weapons through the tacti-
 
 36. Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to John Crittenden, At-
torney General (Mar. 15, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 
1840-1841, at 1140 (1857). 
 37. See Paul Kahn, Nuclear Weapons and the Rule of Law, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 349 (1999). 
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cal uses of the standing army. 
This was very clearly true in the Korean conflict, but it was 
equally clear in the Cuban blockade, the war in Vietnam, and directly 
before us in 1973 when President Nixon put the country’s nuclear 
forces on alert in response to Soviet actions in the Middle East.  Even 
in the mid-’80s, the Reagan administration sought to justify its inter-
vention in Nicaragua by invoking the prospect of Soviet military jets 
that could be stationed there.  These same jets figured in the invasion 
of Grenada in 1983.  The same nuclear threat and counter-threat were 
present in actions not taken by the United States:  we did not directly 
intervene in East Germany in 1953 or Hungary in 1956, or in Poland 
and Afghanistan two decades later.  Because every use of force could 
threaten nuclear confrontation—and nuclear weapons strategy was 
the responsibility of the president—Congress was incapacitated not 
just where the threat was greatest, but in innumerable places in which 
that threat was latent.  The president’s twin responsibilities for nu-
clear weapons and the standing army, reflecting the fact that both 
were instruments and expressions of the Cold War, left Congress in a 
weak, reactive position. 
With the end of the Cold War and the de-escalation of the nu-
clear confrontation, military deployments may be regaining a more 
discrete quality.  The typical, contemporary deployment of U.S. 
forces as part of a multilateral intervention is no longer perceived as 
a skirmish in a larger battle.  Even now, however, the Russian race to 
the airport in Kosovo certainly suggests that the longer postwar his-
tory of confrontation is not fully behind us, just as a confrontation 
with China may loom in our future.  Yet, even if the Cold War has 
ended, there has not been a return to the global order that existed be-
fore the Cold War.  American power operates today within a dis-
tinctly different global regime of legal rights.  We can no longer 
think of the use of force as primarily a matter of domestic decision-
making; globalization has arrived. 
III.  CONGRESSIONAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
There is a tradition in constitutional-law scholarship that re-
quires analysis to treat political institutions as if they always operate 
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in their ideal forms.38  This would mean, for example, imagining 
Congress acting as a rationally deliberative body of politicians de-
voted to the public good, or administrative agencies pursuing bu-
reaucratic rationality to the exclusion of the interests of the regulated 
parties.  But when constitutional responsibilities are to perform a le-
gitimating function, analysis without reference to political reality 
may give us little that relates to the intended constitutional function.  
Congress’s power to legitimate cannot extend beyond its capacity for 
responsible action. 
A. Tactical Advantages of the President 
No matter what scholars might write or say about congressional 
responsibility, the fact is that throughout the postwar period Con-
gress was generally unwilling to exercise its power with respect to 
the use of force.39  When Congress did act, it was only after public 
opinion had dramatically formed against a particular foreign entan-
glement.  For example, Congress did not act to cut off funds for mili-
tary use in Southeast Asia until 1973.40  Similarly, it did not act 
comprehensively to prohibit funds for use by the Contras in Nicara-
gua until after the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors, which dra-
matically moved public opinion against U.S. policy.41 
This political weakness of Congress was directly addressed in 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973.42  Enacted in light of the experi-
ence with Vietnam, the Resolution attempted to shift to the president 
the burden of obtaining congressional approval of the use of force.  
Instead of leaving Congress in the position of having to take the ini-
tiative to stop presidential action, it required termination of all non-
 
 38. See James Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 149 (1893). 
 39. See ELY, supra note 31, at 48-52; HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
117-34 (1990). 
 40. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 24, 87 Stat. 
732. 
 41. See Joint Resolution of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066(a), 
98 Stat. 1837, 1935; Andrew Hayes, The Boland Amendment and Foreign Af-
fairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1567-70 (1988). 
 42. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-
1548 (1994)). 
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congressionally approved military deployments after sixty days.43  
But the War Powers Resolution has not worked.  Instead of a limita-
tion, it came to be seen as a grant of discretionary authority, allowing 
the president to commit forces for a period of sixty days.44  In those 
instances in which the president has judged longer military deploy-
ments to be necessary, the Resolution has not been an obstacle.45  At 
no point has it forced a president to terminate a deployment of force.  
In the recent engagement in Kosovo, the Resolution barely entered 
the public debate.  Hardly anyone even noticed when the sixty day 
period had run.  Indeed, Congress’s failure to insist upon its legisla-
tive prerogatives led a district court to dismiss a lawsuit filed by Rep-
resentative Tom Campbell and thirty other members of Congress, 
seeking enforcement of the Resolution.46 
Three events are particularly forceful markers of congressional 
weakness in the face of the war-making powers of the modern chief 
executive.  First, President Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion to manipulate Congress into giving him the discretion to conduct 
 
 43. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994).  Congress can extend the sixty day pe-
riod to ninety days if the president “determines and certifies to the Congress in 
writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United 
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces . . . .”  Id. 
 44. The Resolution explicitly states that it does not create any presidential 
authority to deploy troops.  See id. § 1547(d)(2).  During the debate in 1973 on 
the War Powers Resolution, Representative William Green of Pennsylvania 
remarked that the Resolution has “popularly been interpreted as limiting the 
President’s power to engage our troops in a war . . . .”  119 CONG. REC. 36,204 
(1973) (statement of Rep. Green).  But, he said, a careful reading of the bill in-
dicated that it is “actually an expansion of Presidential warmaking power, 
rather than a limitation.”  Id.  Representative Vernon Thomson of Wisconsin 
also recognized that his colleagues were misperceiving the actual impact of the 
Resolution:  “The clear meaning of the words certainly points to a dimunition 
rather than an enhancement of the role of Congress in the critical decisions 
whether the country will or will not go to war.” 119 CONG. REC. 36207 (1973) 
(statement of Rep. Thomson). 
 45. For instance, the Act was not an impediment preventing the President 
from deploying armed forces in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf.  See KOH, su-
pra note 39, at 39-40; see also Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the 
War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 30 (1995) (“It is difficult to 
identify any instance in which the Executive desired to undertake a military 
initiative but did not because of the Resolution.”). 
 46. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999). 
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the war in Vietnam as he saw fit.47  This illustrates the capacity of 
the president to control the flow of information—if not to manufac-
ture information—and thus to shape political reactions to events.  
Second, the Reagan administration decided to take the Nicaraguan 
war private.  Here, Congress tried periodically to assert limits on the 
conduct of military activity, but the Executive was able to pursue its 
military policies by other means.48  This illustrates the malleability of 
policy implementation.49  The War Powers Resolution did not speak 
to covert or paramilitary uses of force by intelligence agencies.  This 
became a preferred method of military operations throughout the 
1980s.  Third, Congress approved the Gulf War on the eve of the 
commencement of the bombing campaign.50  This illustrates the 
president’s ability to control the calendar, and thus force congres-
sional decision-making to occur within a context that he has created.  
The president can successfully put Congress in a position from which 
it would be seen as abandoning an on-going military deployment 
were it to withhold consent.51  President Clinton had clearly learned 
this lesson from President Bush, when he committed U.S. air forces 
to the Kosovo campaign.  By the time Congress took up the issue, 
the forces were already engaged. 
 
 47. The House of Representatives passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by a 
unanimous vote; there were only two votes in opposition in the Senate.  This 
support was based solely on President Johnson’s report of the facts—since dis-
credited.  See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 104-16 (Univ. Press 
of Kan. 1995).  In fact, a number of House members and Senators did not think 
it was Congress’s role to question the information or authority of the President 
on such matters.  See ELY, supra note 31, at 15-23; Louis Fisher, Congres-
sional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 958-
61 (1999). 
 48. See Dr. Anthony Simones, The Iran-Contra Affair: Ten Years Later, 67 
UMKC L. REV. 61, 74-76 (1998). 
 49. The President could do this, even when those other means were illegal.  
In the end, no one was criminally punished, and the main perpetrators of the 
policy are successful entrepreneurs of public opinion today, as is exemplified 
by Oliver North’s run for the Senate in Virginia. 
 50. Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, 
H.R.J. Res. 77, 102nd Cong., 105 Stat. 3 (1991).  The Resolution passed by a 
margin of five votes in the Senate and sixty-seven votes in the House. 
 51. See KOH, supra note 39, at 117-33; Paul Kahn, Lessons for Interna-
tional Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REV. 425, 432 (1993); see also 
ELY, supra note 31, at 50-52. 
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Congressional war-making powers will never be an effective 
device for forcing political accountability unless the president is dis-
abled at a far earlier point, before he had taken control of the calen-
dar, the agenda, the flow of information, and the popular perception, 
as well as the actual initial deployment of forces.  No such change is 
about to happen as long as the perception of military risk continues.  
In a nuclear world that is not going to happen. 
B. Congressional Decision-making and Foreign Policy 
The treaty-making power has a kind of isomorphic quality with 
the war-making power.  There is an obvious relationship between 
law and force that is just as true internationally as domestically.  We 
try to use law to prevent conflict; we often use force to respond to 
failures of law.  Yet during the same period in which Congress has 
withdrawn from effective use of its war-powers, Congress has as-
serted itself strongly to block United States participation in several 
new international law regimes favored by the president; it has also 
refused to meet national commitments under existing international 
regimes.  Looking at the most recent Congress, we find just this mix 
of action and inaction.  This Congress acquiesced to a presidential 
decision to conduct a major military campaign in Kosovo.  It refused 
to vote an explicit authorization of the action, but it also failed to 
vote an explicit prohibition.52  This same Congress, however, contin-
ued to deny the President fast-track authority with respect to trade 
agreements, while the Senate dramatically rejected the President’s 
plea for approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.53  
 
 52. On April 28, 1999, Congress voted against declaring war against Yugo-
slavia, H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999), and concurrently voted against au-
thorizing air and missile strikes, S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).  Con-
gress also defeated a resolution which would have directed the President to 
remove U.S. forces from Yugoslavia, H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).  
See Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Campbell v. Clinton: The “Implied Consent” 
Theory of Presidential War Power Is Again Validated, 161 MIL. L. REV. 202, 
205-07 (1999) (describing sequence of congressional actions). 
 53. The President’s fast-track authority to negotiate trade agreements ex-
pired in early 1994.  In September of 1997, the President proposed legislation 
to renew fast-track authority.  See H.R. 2621, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997).  
However, the bill was headed for certain defeat, and the President decided not 
to push for its passage.  In 1998, the President attempted again to pass the fast-
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We have to add to this, congressional refusal to fund foreign aid at 
levels requested by the President; the Senate’s failure to act on nu-
merous executive appointments in this field; and the long failure to 
meet financial obligations to the United Nations.54 
None of this is surprising in light of the isolationist history of 
the country and the generally isolationist tendencies of Congress in 
particular.55  Warnings about foreign entanglements date back to the 
Founding.56  Even when the Senate has approved multilateral con-
                                                                                                                                      
track legislation, but failed on a vote of 180-243.  See Lenin Guerra, The Use 
of Fast Track Authority in the Negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1999, at 172, 186-87 n.32.  On Oc-
tober 13, 1999, the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty.  The final vote was forty-eight in favor of the treaty and fifty-one 
against it.  See Sen. Jon Kyl, Maintaining “Peace Through Strength”: A Rejec-
tion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325 (2000).  
The Senate rejected the treaty even though the President spent two weeks ag-
gressively lobbying for its passage.  See Jane Perlez, Ailing Foreign Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at 16. 
 54. For example, in 1998, the House approved only $12.7 billion for for-
eign aid in H.R. 2606.  This was fourteen percent less than President Clinton 
requested.  The President vetoed the bill.  The President and Senate have also 
disagreed about paying back UN dues.  In 1997, Ambassador Bill Richardson 
testified before Congress that the United States should pay nearly $1 billion in 
back dues.  See William Scally, U.N. Ambassador Nominee Says U.S. Plans to 
Pay Debt; Helms Demands Reforms Before Settling Past Dues, ROCKY MTN. 
NEWS, Jan. 30, 1997, at A33.  But, in both 1997 and 1998, Congress did not 
meet the administration’s funding request.  Finally, in 1999, Congress and the 
White House reached a compromise, and Congress passed the Helms-Biden 
provision which authorizes $819 million for arrears payment and would for-
give $107 million that the UN currently owes the United States. The payment 
is contingent, however, on the UN meeting many conditions of reform, includ-
ing reducing the U.S. financial contribution from twenty-five percent to twenty 
percent of the regular UN budget.  See S. REP. NO. 106-43 (1999); S. 886, 
106th Cong. (1999). 
 55. More broadly, the Senate refused to ratify the International Covenant on 
Political and Civil Rights until 1993, and the Genocide Convention until 1986.  
The United States is one of two countries that has refused to accede to the 
Convention on the Rights of Children; it has refused to ratify the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  See Jorge A. Banales, On Eve of 
Summit, Rights Issues Listed, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Apr. 14, 1998; see also A 
Lens on Children, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1994, at 12. 
 56. The most famous of the early warnings was in Washington’s Farewell 
Address.  See GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS (1796), reprinted 
in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 524-26 (W.B. Allen ed., Liberty 
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ventions, it has often insisted on limiting their reach and effect, par-
ticularly any effect that would subject the United States to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of an international court.57  What is surprising, 
however, is that a Congress so wary of international entanglements 
has nevertheless been reluctant to confront the president when he 
commits forces abroad.  So far, I have argued that the president has 
certain tactical advantages over Congress in this area, but the prob-
lems are deeper.  They go to the structure of congressional decision-
making. 
Domestically, Congress often works best through a process of 
articulation of policy differences and then compromise.  The parties 
set out widely divergent positions as an initial matter.  This allows 
them to establish distinct identities, which in turn allows appeals to 
different groups of constituents.  Difference is then overcome 
through a process of negotiated compromise.  Compromise is often 
made possible by the fact that it can be multidimensional:  in seeking 
to achieve a compromise in one area, bargains can be made in other 
areas.  Compromise occurs not only within Congress, but in the pro-
cess of negotiation between the Congress and the executive.58  To 
fully understand the act of negotiating compromise, moreover, one 
                                                                                                                                      
Classics 1988).  In the first part of the twentieth century, we saw the disastrous 
failure of Wilson to obtain Senate approval of U.S. participation in the League 
of Nations, and Roosevelt’s battle with Congress over intervention in the early 
years of the Second World War.  See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 68-72 (1967). 
 57. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278; David J. Scheffer, Non-Judicial 
State Remedies and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 27 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 83, 144-50 (1990). 
 58. Fiorina argues that members of Congress have a political interest in 
compromise:  “[T]he struggle for political credit sometimes makes both parties 
as likely to compromise behind some legislation as to allow the process to 
stalemate.”  MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 90 (2d ed. 1996); see 
also Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chas-
tening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 52-55 (noting that 
Congress is more likely to compromise than to pass a programmatic agenda).  
Kristy Carroll argues that the legislative process reveals that the president has a 
role in negotiating legislative compromises and suggesting the substantive 
scope of legislation.  See Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute Is It Anyway? Why 
and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpret-
ing Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 518-21 (1997). 
 
November 2000]   WAR POWERS AND THE MILLENNIUM 29 
 
 
must consider the role of Washington lobbyists who provide infor-
mation and coordinate interest group positions.59 
This process of party differentiation followed by compromise 
produces consensus around the middle, which is generally the safest 
position in American politics.  Americans tend to distinguish be-
tween politics and government, and do not like it when government 
is driven too explicitly by political ends.60  They generally expect 
their politicians to shed the party differentiating ideologies that get 
them elected and to tend to the task of governance under standards of 
policy rationality.  When this process of compromise appears too 
risky, when it cuts too deeply into the entrenched political positions 
of the parties, we have seen appeals to bipartisan, expert commis-
sions, the responsibility of which is to articulate the middle ground 
and so to relieve the pressure on the politicians as they move toward 
a common ground.61 
With respect to foreign affairs, however, these techniques of 
congressional decision-making work poorly.  The differentiation that 
marks the parties as distinct and separate, and is domestically an ini-
tial step toward compromise, serves the same differentiating function 
in foreign policy, but there it tends to freeze party positions.  Treaties 
come before the Senate too late in the process for compromise to be 
 
 59. See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE GUÉHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION STATE 20-
22 (1995); Elizabeth Garret, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Re-
quirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998). 
 60. This norm appears in constitutional law as the ubiquitous rationality 
test:  public policy must be founded on a public rationale that represents more 
than political interests.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Con-
stitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); see also Michael Tackett & Wil-
liam Neikirk, GOP Facing its Own Trial, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 1998, at N1 
(noting that the Republican party received its lowest approval rating in over 
one decade as a result of the highly partisan impeachment of President Clin-
ton). 
 61. This was the technique successfully used on social security reform, 
military base closing, and restructuring medicare.  See generally Robert H. 
Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 311, 316, 319 (1998) (discussing use of appointed councils and 
bipartisan commissions on social security and medicare issues); Natalie Han-
lon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission, 62 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 331, 339 (1991) (discussing use of commissions in military 
base closings). 
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an option, particularly when they are multiparty covenants.62  More-
over, compromises can look like concessions of U.S. interests to for-
eign states, rather than a distribution among competing elements of 
the polity.  Nor is there a great deal of pressure to compromise.  Re-
jecting foreign policy initiatives is a way of preserving the status 
quo, and preserving the international status quo is rarely a policy for 
which one is held politically accountable.  It is hard to make an issue 
out of a failure to change the conditions that prevail internationally, 
when the country is enjoying power, prestige, and wealth.  Unable to 
compromise, the Senate can end up doing nothing, and then treaty 
ratification fails.  Difference leads to stalemate, rather than to nego-
tiation.  The problem is greatly exacerbated by the two-thirds re-
quirement for ratification.63  This structural bias toward inaction ac-
counts in part for the use of executive agreements in place of 
treaties.64  These agreements make use of some of the tactical advan-
tages of presidential initiative.  Many of the structural problems re-
main, however, when executive agreements require subsequent con-
gressional approval. 
If the issue involves the use of force, compromise is particularly 
difficult.  A compromise that produces a less substantial response to 
a foreign policy crisis can look like a lack of commitment.  Dis-
agreement now threatens to appear to offer an “exploitable weak-
ness” to adversaries.  Congress cannot simply give the president less 
of what he wants, when what he wants is a military deployment.  
 
 62. Not controlling the origins of the text, the Senate will sometimes try to 
control future readings of the text by adding unilateral “declarations”—not 
quite “reservations”—to its ratifications.  See Phillip R. Trimble, All Fall 
Down: The Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 55, 62-63 (1998). 
 63. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 64. See KOH, supra note 39, at 41-42.  Bruce Ackerman and David Golove 
have shown that precisely because of the difficulties in adjusting this eight-
eenth-century mechanism of Senate consent to a twentieth-century world of 
American global leadership, a new form of international commitments has 
evolved.  Under this alternative, the president leads through the formation of 
executive agreements, which are then subject to congressional—not only Sen-
ate—approval.  The president, accordingly, sets the starting point of the debate, 
by making a commitment to other states.  This is just the pattern of the War 
Powers Act.  See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Con-
stitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995). 
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There cannot easily be compromises on a range of unrelated issues in 
order to achieve support for a military deployment.  While that may 
happen, it has the look of disregard for the national interests and of 
putting politics ahead of the public interest.  Nor can Congress easily 
adopt the technique of the expert commission.65  The timeframe of a 
crisis usually will not allow it.  More importantly, the military—
particularly in the form of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—has already pre-
empted the claim of expertise, as well as the claim to be “apolitical.”  
Finally, there is little room for the private lobbyist with respect to 
these decisions. 
Congress, in short, is not capable of acting because it only 
knows how to reach compromise across dissensus.  When disagree-
ment looks unpatriotic, and compromise appears dangerous, Con-
gress is structurally disabled.  This produces the double consequence 
for American foreign policy of a reluctance to participate in much of 
the global development of international law—outside of those trade 
and finance arrangements that are in our immediate self-interest—
and a congressional abdication of use of force decisions to the presi-
dent.  The same structural incapacities are behind these seemingly 
contradictory results. 
The vices of congressional decision-making in this area are bal-
anced by the corresponding presidential virtues.  The president can 
formulate a policy; the president need not compromise to act; the 
president can publicly claim responsibility for a position without 
having to distinguish his position from that of his political oppo-
nents; and the president almost inevitably can speak with the support 
of military experts.  Because the president can do all of this, he is 
uniquely accountable for foreign policy decisions, especially on the 
use of force.66 
There is little doubt that the president believes he will be held 
politically accountable for American foreign policy decisions to use 
force.  The recent loss of seventeen servicemen in Somalia deeply af-
fected the methods of military deployment, precisely because of a 
 
 65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 66. This is true as long as he acts openly—a principle violated by the 
Reagan policies in Central America and in the Iran-Contra affair.  See KOH, 
supra note 39, at 118. 
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fear that the public would not approve military losses outside of a 
narrow range of vital national interests.67  The Clinton policy on the 
use of force, whatever else we may think about it, is directly respon-
sive to an assessment of what is politically acceptable.68  This dy-
namic of public accountability is not likely to be improved by requir-
ing congressional action. 
If the president is publicly accountable, then it is not necessarily 
the case that Congress’s failure has produced a sort of democracy 
deficit.  Indeed, our most compelling problem today is not democ-
ratic accountability for the use of force, but Congress’s structural 
weakness in assessing American participation in an emerging global 
order.  To insist that the constitutional text requires congressional 
approval of any commitment of American military forces that places 
them at risk would put the war-declaring function in the same posi-
tion as the treaty-making function.  The consequence would be an ef-
fective withdrawal of American forces from an active international 
role. 
One unfortunate consequence of our domestic, ideological wars 
of the ’60s and the ’70s, and particularly of our experience over 
Vietnam, is an academic tendency to argue for the further democrati-
zation of use of force decisions.  This is the lens through which the 
war-declaring power of Congress is viewed.  For the reasons 
sketched above, however, the political and institutional underpin-
nings for such a view are unrealistic.  More importantly, we are al-
ready at a point at which there is too much “public accountability,” 
given the ends for which force is deployed today.  The democratiza-
tion of the war powers is a Cold War agenda that no longer makes 
sense in a post-Cold War era.  To understand this we have to investi-
gate the changing character of the international legal order. 
 
 67. Compare the earlier tragedy in Lebanon.  On October 23, 1983, a sui-
cide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks killed 239 American servicemen.  
The bombing generated a political backlash against the mission.  See Christo-
pher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bar-
gaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 
649-53 (1995) (discussing the ways the bombing induced the administration to 
consider a quick Lebanon withdrawal in the hope that the political damage 
would subside before the 1984 election). 
 68. See Trimble, supra note 62, at 60. 
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IV.  THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
If the drafters of the UN Charter hoped to inaugurate an era of 
non-use of force in international relations, they failed.  The law of 
the Charter not only prohibited the use of force, but even the “threat” 
to use force.69  Nevertheless, the world of the postwar era rapidly be-
came one in which the threat to use world-destroying force set the 
basic conditions of all international relations, and much of our do-
mestic political order as well.  We characterize this era as that of the 
Cold War precisely because international relations were organized 
around the use of force.  However, we may judge the actual likeli-
hood of recourse to nuclear force during this period, it surely is un-
controversial to say that this was not the world that the substantive 
law of the Charter had imagined.  Nevertheless, it was a world that 
the institutions of the UN system permitted to develop. 
Invented in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Charter 
system represented a balance between ideal form and political real-
ity.  Formally, the resolution of disputes among states was to occur 
within a framework in which law specified rights and obligations.  
The underlying vision was Hobbesian.  States—the subjects of inter-
national law—had existed in a state of nature, settling their dis-
agreements by force of arms.  Through law they would now enter 
into a new political order in which each abandoned an entitlement to 
use force against the others.  Just as law displaced force domesti-
cally, so it would on the international level.  Change, were it to come 
at all, would come through consent.70 
This ideal of law, however, never had much to do with the insti-
tutions created by the Charter system.  While the new international 
law established rights, it did little to establish legal procedures and 
institutions for the adjustment of rights or the resolution of conflicts.  
In this sense, the Charter declared an end to war too soon, before all 
the parties were content with the distribution of entitlements that the 
law would attempt to preserve.71  Thus, the law of the Charter was 
 
 69. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 70. See Paul Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Posi-
tion in Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 
12 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 30-32 (1987) (discussing the domestic analogy). 
 71. Justice Pal made a similar point in his dissenting judgment in THE 
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wholly inadequate to the movement for decolonization that began 
almost immediately after the war.72 
More importantly, the Charter failed to establish anything re-
sembling the Hobbesian sovereign that would enforce the law of the 
new international order.  Instead, the new institutions privileged the 
interests and views of particular states.  No supra-state agency with 
any effective power of legal enforcement was established.73  There 
may have been a supra-national law on the use of force, but there 
were only inter-national institutions.  The supra-national institutions 
that did develop tended to be in technical areas, for example, regimes 
of communication, banking, and commercial transactions.74 
The institutions of the Charter were not designed to break the 
link between a state’s perception of its vital interests and its policies 
on the use of force.  The veto’s concentration of power in the perma-
nent members of the Security Council made this palpably self-
evident.  Thus, the contradiction of the Charter World:  it was simul-
taneously a world in which use of force was legally prohibited and in 
which spending on and deployment of domestic military forces 
wildly escalated.75  We had an international law of non-use of force 
                                                                                                                                      
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 101-04 (1953). 
 72. In particular, Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, establishing an 
International Trusteeship System, failed to operate effectively in the transition 
of colonies to statehood.  See U.N. CHARTER art. 76. 
 73. In contrast, European Community law and the judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice interpreting that law have supremacy over conflicting 
municipal laws as well as direct effect in municipal systems.  See PAUL CRAIG 
& GRÁINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 163-67, 255-
64 (2d ed. 1998); see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 
YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-15 (1991). 
 74. For example, in the mid-1940s the Allied governments created the Bret-
ton Woods System—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The purpose of these institutions 
was to facilitate economic transactions and to promote a stable economic or-
der.  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1968); INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
AND DEV., ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (1966); General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 75. Worldwide military spending peaked in 1987 at $1.36 trillion.  See U.S. 
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY 
EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 53 (1995). 
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and an institutional order structured around constant warfare of one 
form or another. 
This gap between law and institutions went to the heart of the 
Hobbesian vision of a global rule of law that would displace the 
global state of nature.  Putting the Security Council at the top of this 
system of law was like trying to establish a Hobbesian domestic or-
der with a council of war lords at the top, instead of a decision-maker 
whose interests did not align with any particular factional interest.  
International institutions, rather than voicing the new international 
law, became new fora for the traditional, political clash of nation-
states.  The only specifically legal institution created by the Charter, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was rendered ineffective, and 
in fact almost invisible, by the consensual character of its jurisdic-
tion.76  For most of the Cold War, it never occurred to anyone that 
the court could have a useful role to play because there was no sense 
that international law was normatively superior to international poli-
tics.  Indeed, the structure of the Charter’s provisions on the court 
seemed to emphasize the opposite, making enforcement of ICJ 
judgments a political responsibility of the Security Council.77 
These institutional failures to advance from politics to law were 
not the result of poor design decisions; these were not technical prob-
lems in the drafting process.  In the political reality that was the Cold 
War, there was no alternative to the veto because there was no 
agreement on the idea that international law could and should dis-
place politics.  The Security Council was not a forum for law beyond 
politics, but only another forum for a politics that had become war by 
other means.  As the majority in the General Assembly shifted in re-
sponse to decolonization throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
 
 76. Under Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ, the court does not have juris-
diction over a dispute without the consent of the state parties involved in the 
dispute.  See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 
I.C.J. 19 (June 15).  When the ICJ has been aggressive in construing consent, 
states, including the United States, have simply refused to participate further in 
the merits stage of the case.  See Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the 
Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-
Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288 (Lori Fisher Damrosch ed., 1987). 
 77. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2. 
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same characterization became true there.  The state was not asked to 
transform itself or its agenda insofar as it participated in international 
institutions.  The Charter merely changed the fora within which the 
battles of the international state of nature were played out.  Thus, the 
prohibition on the use of force admitted one explicit exception:  self-
defense.78  This was not so much an exception to the rule as the reve-
lation of the purpose of the rule.  The rule prohibiting use of 
 
force was all about the defense of the state.  The era of the Charter 
rapidly became the era of the nation-state. 
The Charter world was not Hobbes’s world of law, but rather a 
world of threat and counter-threat, maintaining stability by delineat-
ing spheres of influence controlled by hegemonic powers.  The Cold 
War confrontation produced competing military alliances that were 
reminiscent of European politics of the nineteenth century.  These al-
liances determined the actions, and failures to act, of the Charter in-
stitutions.  Indeed, one would be hard pressed throughout this period 
to find evidence that the international law on the use of force was de-
termining state behavior.  There is far more evidence the other way:  
the threat of force was determining interpretations of the meaning of 
the legal rules.  Thus, it was not particularly incongruous to see the 
deployment of the Brezhnev Doctrine, on one side, and the Reagan 
Doctrine on the other.79  This was the world in which the president 
assumed responsibility for American deployments of force and Con-
gress acquiesced. 
The late twentieth century addition to the balance of power poli-
tics of the nineteenth century was effectively to globalize the idea of 
the nation-state.  The superpower rivalry allowed third-world nation-
 
 78. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms 
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 811 (1970). 
 79. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union claimed the right to in-
tervene militarily to defend international socialism.  See PETER ZWICK, SOVIET 
FOREIGN RELATIONS: PROCESS AND POLICY 92 (1990).  Under the Reagan 
Doctrine, the United States claimed the right to intervene militarily to defend 
or to restore self-government.  See generally W. Michael Reisman, Old Wine 
in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 171, 175-80 (1988) (explaining 
an explicit doctrine and security responsibility against communist penetration 
in the Western Hemisphere, evolving from the Monroe Doctrine). 
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alists a space within which to manage decolonization.  Thus, despite 
the fact that this was a period of spheres of influence, it was also a 
period in which the nation-state emerged as the only acceptable po-
litical form.  Every territory and colony—indeed every secessionist 
movement—sought the same thing:  statehood.  Only in law were all 
of these new states equal.  Many were the accidental legacies of co-
lonialism, with no basis in a national community and no independent 
economic or military base.80  These were “quasi-states” supported by 
external powers militarily and economically, and maintained for-
mally through an international law that insisted on state sovereignty 
and formal equality.81  Legal appearances were hardly reality.  An 
international law founded on an idea of state sovereignty was in large 
part a vehicle for maintaining a post-colonial order divided into 
spheres of influence within which a kind of imperial order was main-
tained between hegemon and client states. 
Decolonization was inextricably linked to the Cold War.  These 
new states rapidly became the sites of superpower conflict.  Legally, 
these wars were funneled through the sole exception for use of force:  
self-defense and collective self-defense.82  This proved a remarkably 
malleable concept, as each side deployed the claim of self-defense 
against its opponents.83  In retrospect, we can see just how much the 
post-colonial wars were a function of the superpower confrontation.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, there has 
been an end to the proxy wars.  Latin America, except for Columbia, 
is substantially at peace; Southeast Asia has turned dramatically to-
ward western economic forms—and, increasingly, political forms as 
well.  Parts of Africa remain a disaster, but no one believes that we 
can understand the collapsed states there in terms of the ideological 
conflict that shaped the disputes a generation ago.  This is not to say 
that peace has broken out all over.  Rather, the conflicts we find can 
no longer be analyzed as proxy wars:  they have to be understood on 
local terms, as conflicts among indigenous groups. 
 
 80. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 21 (1990). 
 81. See id. at 21-26. 
 82. See Franck, supra note 78, at 811. 
 83. See id. 
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As one war after another filled the first fifty years of the Char-
ter’s life, and as the era that some had hoped would be that of a 
global community under law instead witnessed the apotheosis of the 







had completely broken down.84  Under these conditions, a new focus 
or goal of the international community emerged:  human rights. 
Encouraging respect for human rights was listed among the 
original purposes of the Charter.85  Yet, human rights were not de-
scribed there as elements of a global legal regime.86  The Charter 
was committed to a positivist view of the origins of international law, 
i.e., the law was a product of state consent.  At the time of the draft-
ing, there was as yet no such consent with respect to human rights.87  
 
 84. We need to remember that some eighty-six million people died in the 
military conflicts of this period, that at least 220 wars raged, and that even 
those societies that seemed secure—including our own—lived a hair’s breath 
away from sudden and complete destruction.  See Christopher C. Joyner, Re-
dressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration 
and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 591 (1998); 
Dr. Roy Lee, The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspectives 
and Prospects for Ratification, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 505 (2000). 
 85. See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United 
States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 912-14 
(1984). 
 86. The preamble to the United Nations Charter requires member states to 
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.”  U.N. CHARTER pmbl.  In addi-
tion, Article 1(3) lists one of the purposes of the Charter as “promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights.”  U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.  However, 
no Article in the Charter imposes a legal duty on member States not to infringe 
upon any particular human right. 
 87. This is evidenced by the fact that states would only consent to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights as long as it did not establish a “treaty” 
obligation.  See generally Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 287 (1996) (discussing the significance of the Declaration of Human 
Rights on customary international law and its application by international and 
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It was, after all, still largely a world of colonial powers and colonies.  
At most, the Charter assumed that if states were protected from out-
side intervention, the governments that emerged would ordinarily be 
representative of the people’s interests.88  Human rights would de-
velop, in other words, within secure borders.  Once again, it did not 
work out that way. 
Respect for human rights was a goal that was easy to agree to in 
the abstract, but difficult to make effective as a rule of law.  
Throughout the Cold War, agreement on human rights was pur-
chased through an institutional commitment to nonaction.  Just as 
governments that never disarmed agreed to a prohibition on even the 
threat to use force, so governments that existed in substantial part 
only through their suppression of human rights agreed to abstract 
principles of human rights.  Of course not all states that agreed to the 
human rights agenda were hypocritical.  Some thought the new focus 
on human rights was a necessary response to the character of those 
new governments that had emerged through the politics of decoloni-
zation, as well to the recent past of Europe itself; others genuinely 
believed in an emerging transnational community which needed to 
establish a normative vision against which governmental behavior 
could be measured; others thought the rhetoric of human rights of-
fered a useful tool for criticizing the behavior of political adversar-
ies.89  While all these reasons operated, the critical fact was that once 
again the norms of international law were developing independently 
of international institutions. 
In an era in which the entire world was held hostage to state per-
ceptions of vital national interests, there was the birth and then sub-
stantial growth of human rights law.  The great project of interna-
tional law for the past fifty years has been to define the rights that 
accrue to individuals simply by virtue of their membership in the 
global community of humanity.  This project of law-creation was 
pursued largely by academics and non-governmental organizations, 
even as the world continued to witness one authoritarian regime after 
                                                                                                                                      
national courts). 
 88. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the 
Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1982). 
 89. See generally JACKSON, supra note 80, at 44-46, 139-63 (discussing the 
expectation of humanitarian conduct in international law). 
 
40 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:11 
 
 
another use the tools of state power to abuse its citizens.  There was 
never any explanation of how the emerging international law of hu-
man rights would somehow manage to bypass the political reality of 
a world of nation-states gathered in hostile camps that continued to 
threaten each other militarily.90 
Thus, we had the odd juxtaposition of law and its violation 
throughout this period.  There were legal prohibitions on genocide, 
torture, murder, and discrimination; guarantees of civil and political 
rights including freedom of thought and religion; protections of non-
combatants from the dangers of war; as well as specific protections 
for women and children.91  Yet, there was an endless succession of 
conflicts in which murder, torture, and disappearances were com-
mon, in which noncombatants were targeted, in which entire 
groups—ethnic, religious, and political—were suppressed, dispos-
sessed, and driven from their homes.  Women were raped and 
abused, while children were compelled to bear arms.  Governments 
squandered their resources on arms, while their populations suffered.  
The puzzle of the postwar period is to understand the relationship of 
law and its violation.  Was it the age of human rights law or the age 
 
 90. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe began with the 
Helsinki Accords in 1973.  The Final Act of the Helsinki Accords was signed 
on August 1, 1975.  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final 
Act, adopted Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292.  Principle VII of the Final Act 
states, “participating States will respect human rights and fundamental free-
doms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”  Id. at 1295.  To the 
surprise of the signators, the Helsinki Accords came to play a powerful role in 
the internal political developments in Eastern Europe, leading to the events of 
1989.  See Michael F. Rinzler, Comment, Battling Authoritarianism Through 
Treaty: Soviet Dissent and International Human Rights Regimes, 35 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 461, 467, 482-84 (1994). 
 91. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 350; Draft Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mar. 9, 1984, 23 
I.L.M. 1027 (draft only); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 
20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (entered into force on Sept. 2, 1990). 
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of human rights abuse?  The age of the prohibition on the use of 
force, or the age of war?  We have to see it as both and to understand 
the matrix of elements that produced this paradoxical situation. 
With the end of the Cold War, there has been a fundamental 
change.  Today, the uses of force that actually threaten world order 
are overwhelmingly internal; they are civil, not international wars.92  
What is wrong with these civil wars is not that they produce large 
refugee flows across their borders—although they do this and it is 
certainly a problem.  The justification for international concern, 
however, is not found in these consequences for other states, but in 
the profound offense to a moral sense—to human rights—that these 
conflicts produce.  The fundamental, normative sense of international 
order has shifted from a world in which Article 2(4) is to be re-
spected—a world of secure, sovereign states—to a world in which 
moral norms of individual rights are to be respected. 
The international law of human rights, which owes its very exis-
tence to an institutional situation in which it was not and could not be 
effective, has suddenly become the normative core of a new post–
Cold War global order.  The gross violations of human rights in 
Haiti, West Africa, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, 
Somalia, and Rwanda have prompted international responses.  Those 
responses have often been inadequate, and there have been numerous 
failures to respond, but that there should be a response is now ac-
cepted.  That there can be a response comes well within the range of 
the ordinary political imagination.  Increasingly, it is the failure to 
intervene, not intervention that requires explanation.  We saw this 
most dramatically, for example, in the recent intervention in East 
Timor. 
 
 92. For instance, fighting in the former Yugoslavia began as an internal 
conflict but became internationalized when its internal borders became interna-
tional borders.  See CONFERENCE FOR PEACE IN YUGOSLAVIA ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION:  Opinion Nos. 8 & 11, reprinted in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, OFFICIAL PAPERS 1284-86, 
1290-93 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997).  The great harm inflicted upon innocent 
civilians through the use of force in internal conflicts is recorded in the indict-
ment filed in the case of Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT–94–I (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 13, 1995), http://www.courttv.com/ 
casefiles/warcrimes/documents/borov.html (indictment from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). 
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We are, of course, far less certain about the relative ordering of 
human rights and state sovereignty norms when we deal with China 
and Russia than when we deal with states of Africa, Southeast Asia, 
and Latin America.  Yet the change is undeniable:  the relentless dis-
course—academic, popular, and official—on the emerging global 
order continually holds up a vision of international human rights.  
The Cold War is a receding memory; the only deployments of force 
that we imagine in the short and medium term are those that would 
enforce human rights norms.93  Even those we cast as “enemies”—
for example, the regimes of Iraq, Serbia, or perhaps North Korea— 
we understand, within a human rights framework:  it is not the peo-
ple of the state, but the regime that we oppose.  The people, we be-
lieve, suffer from the human rights abuses of their governments.  
They too are victims.  These are not enemy states, but “rogue” re-
gimes.  Intervention is seen as a matter of enforcing human rights 
norms, even if it is the case that innocent people suffer the conse-
quences of the intervention. 
The pressing question today is not “what is the distribution of 
foreign affairs power between Congress and the president?” but 
rather, “what is the institutional mechanism through which the 
United States will assume its role in the emerging global order?”  
Too often, American constitutional lawyers see the issue here as one 
that rests merely on differences of political belief:  is the U.S. role 
one of forceful, international leadership or is it one of withdrawal 
from entanglements abroad?  Following Holmes’s dictum that the 
Constitution is made for people of widely different views on issues 
of policy,94 there is a tendency to believe that interpretation of the 
war powers provisions must proceed in a way that is independent of 
such policy considerations.  But this distinction between law and pol-
icy disables the debate from the beginning.  The deep and complex 
issue here involves the manner in which two different conceptions of 
the rule of law will intersect in the next generation. 
 
 93. Some international theorists worry that China may pose an emerging 
threat to the United States.  See generally RICHARD BERNSTEIN & ROSS H. 
MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA (1997). 
 94. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
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V. CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWERS 
Every interpretation of the constitutional distribution of war 
powers occurs against a sense of the imaginable uses of force—the 
kinds of force that can be used and the ends for which it would be 
used.  This was true at the time of the drafting, and it remains true 
today.  A reading that renders the United States unable to defend it-
self or to pursue its vital interests fails a test of minimal plausibil-
ity.95  Equally, however, an interpretation develops against a percep-
tion of the possible abuses of power, which a constitutional structure 
should be designed to mitigate.  The authority to deploy force, like 
every other constitutional power, is simultaneously the power to pur-
sue national interests and to commit abuses—indeed, particularly 
dangerous abuses.  Arguments often occur because where one inter-
preter sees vital national interests, another sees an abuse of power. 
Whether a deployment of force is perceived as necessary or abu-
sive depends, in substantial part, on the way in which one perceives 
American interests to align or fail to align with the norms of the in-
ternational order.  Those norms, however, do not remain stable.  The 
world of 1900—at least the developed world—was still largely struc-
tured by the Peace of Westphalia, while today’s norms increasingly 
express a global order of human rights.  In between, we experienced 
the rise of ideological politics, leading first to the Second World 
War, and then to the Cold War.  To think that the vision of United 
States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.,96 let alone the drafters’ vision 
of 1787, is particularly relevant to the American position in this new 
world order is to come to the debate with a wholly inadequate set of 
intellectual tools, unless one is so deeply committed to an idea of 
American exceptionalism that nothing that actually happens in the 
world can make any difference.  Our problem today is that scholars 
of constitutional law too often maintain an interpretive framework 
appropriate for the Cold War, insensitive to the new law of human 
rights. 
The modern history of interpretation of the constitutional distri-
bution of war powers begins with the war in Vietnam, and its secret 
 
 95. See supra Part II. 
 96. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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extension to Cambodia and Laos.  The American legal scholar of the 
Vietnam-war era understood the problem of the use of force abroad 
within a broader Cold War framework.97  He or she saw military in-
tervention in Southeast Asia as yet another form of legal abuse 
brought about by the passions of ideological confrontation.98  Just as 
the fear of communism led to McCarthyism and the violation of First 
Amendment rights at home—as well as to domestic uses of internal 
police forces in violation of constitutional norms—that same fear led 
to coercive interventions abroad.  There was a single continuum of 
illegal behavior brought about by an ideologically induced panic.  
That behavior might be wiretapping at home or subversive activity 
abroad.  Beyond subversion of political institutions abroad—for ex-
ample in Guatemala, Iran, and the early years of Vietnam99—was the 
actual commitment of American forces.  Thus, the Pentagon Papers 
case100 appeared as the domestic side of a single phenomenon, the 
outward manifestation of which was the war in Vietnam.101 
 
 97. See The Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam 
(1966), reprinted in 1 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 597 
(Richard A. Falk ed., 1968); Phillip Bobbitt, Courts and Constitutions: War 
Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional 
Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1370 (1994). 
 98. See Bobbit, supra note 97, at 1364-66; Major Michael P. Kelly, Fixing 
the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 88 (1993); Jules Lobel, Emergency 
Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1423 n.206 (1989). 
 99. See Francis A. Boyle, International Crisis and Neutrality: United States 
Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War, 43 MERCER L. REV. 523, 540 
(1991).  See generally ZALIN GRANT, FACING THE PHOENIX: THE CIA AND 
THE POLITICAL DEFEAT OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM (1991) (describ-
ing coup attempts staged by the CIA to oust South Vietnamese President Ngo 
Dinh Diem); Mark Gibney, United States’ Responsibility for Gross Levels of 
Human Rights Violations in Guatemala from 1954 to 1996, 7 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 77 (1997) (characterizing U.S. aid in Guatemala as covert CIA op-
erations that advanced counter-insurgency plans). 
 100. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 101. Those scholars that did not take this position found themselves accused 
of being apologists for American foreign policy.  See Richard A. Falk, Casting 
the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991, 
2001 (1995) (book review) (arguing that McDougal’s position on Vietnam had 
an uncomfortable tendency to coincide with the outlook of the U.S. govern-
ment and was more polemical than scientific); see also Detlev Vagts, Juris-
prudence For a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and Policy, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 335, 338 (1993) (book review) (claiming McDougal lost students be-
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For the legal scholar of the Vietnam era, there was an easy as-
sumption that international law and domestic constitutional law 
worked in the same alignment.  They had to because law represented 
principled commitments above the short-term fray of political battles 
here and abroad.  Law represented the appeal to reason as the source 
of social order, and the aspiration of reason is always universal.  If 
law expresses universal principles, there must be fundamental 
agreement between the norms of domestic and of international 
law.102  The task of the scholar-lawyer, then, was to affirm the norms 
of law in order to bring the nation back to its core principles.  In do-
ing so, law would protect those suffering from the abuses of govern-
mental power at home and abroad. 
Military intervention was viewed as a problem of power slipping 
out of the control of law:  domestic and international.  Both the do-
mestic and the international legal orders established institutional, 
procedural checks on the threat of military action.  Just as the Consti-
tution set up the check of congressional approval on executive 
adventurism,103 so the Charter set up the check of Security Council 
approval.104  Domestically, force is only legitimate if approved by 
Congress; internationally, force is only legitimate if approved by the 
Security Council.  Of course, the Security Council was not a particu-
larly democratic institution.  Nevertheless, agreement among its 
members would represent consensus across widely divergent systems 
of political beliefs:  a task at least as difficult as obtaining a consen-
sus across the different beliefs and factions represented in Congress. 
Institutionally, at both the national and the international level, 
there were built-in biases against the use of force.  Agreement to use 
force would always be exceptional.  This mind-set produced much of 
                                                                                                                                      
cause of his view of expanded presidential powers). 
 102. American political thought to this day cannot grasp the idea that there 
might be substantive disagreement between international law and our own con-
stitutional norms.  See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Jan. 30, 
1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 650, 659.  This belief was, in part, behind the appeal of 
the world federalist project for a powerful world government under law.  See, 
e.g., GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD 
LAW (3d ed. 1966). 
 103. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 104. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
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the legal scholarship on the use of force beginning with Vietnam and 
going right through the end of the Cold War.  Scholars wrote about 
“foreign affairs law,” by which they meant that mix of international 
and constitutional law that restrained the use of force.105  In checking 
presidential uses of force, Congress would simultaneously affirm the 
international legal norm prohibiting the use of force.  The legal 
scholar was speaking to one audience when he or she insisted on ad-
herence to both the constitutional norm of congressional responsibil-
ity and the international legal norm of Security Council approval.  
Neither Congress nor the Security Council was likely to be enthusi-
astic about the use of force in situations short of self-defense.  Ironi-
cally, in just that situation of self-defense, affirmative action was re-
quired of neither institution. 
In the face of a Cold War militarization of foreign policy both 
here and abroad, legal scholars generally found themselves arguing 
for an increasingly formalist view of the law of the Charter, as well 
as of the war-declaring power of Congress.  Article 2(4)’s prohibi-
tion on the use of force was just that:  a strict ban on any and all use 
of force outside of the mechanisms of Chapter Seven.106  Similarly, 
the congressional war-declaring power was a ban on the use of force 
without congressional approval.  Both were subject to a single excep-
tion:  self-defense in response to armed attack.107 
This straightforward appeal to text as the limit of legal interpre-
tation had a similar effect in both dimensions of law:  throughout this 
period there was a growing division between the law of academics 
and political reality.  Arguments about the legal prohibition on the 
use of force under the Charter regime had the same air of unreality as 
arguments in the 1930s to the effect that the Kellog-Briand Pact had 
made recourse to war illegal.108  The Cold War was an era of milita-
 
 105. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996); SOFAER, supra note 17. 
 106. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 107. Appealing to text and formalism may have been an odd position for 
these scholars, who in other fields of legal interpretation were more likely to 
pursue “dynamic” forms of interpretation.  But here formalism was the key to 
invoking the rule of law virtues as restraints on the executive’s tendency to act 
unilaterally. 
 108. In Article 1 of the Kellog-Briand Pact the parties “condemn recourse to 
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rization on both the macro-level of superpower conflict and the 
micro-level of post-colonial regimes.  Similarly, there was no rela-
tionship between the claim that only Congress could commit Ameri-
can forces and the actual deployments of American forces through-
out the Cold War.  In many places around the world, the Cold War 
was a hot war, and in all of those places it was the president who 
committed American forces.  Congress rarely objected and with very 
few exceptions continued to fund those deployments.109  Nor did the 
War Powers Resolution, which every president declared unconstitu-
tional, shift the domestic balance of power with respect to the use of 
force.110  Just as there were no international institutions able to en-
force Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force, there were no 
domestic institutions willing and able to pursue the congressional 
power to declare war as an enforceable rule of law.  Courts stead-
fastly refused to get involved in this dispute.111  Nevertheless, the 
more war slipped the bonds of law, the more the legal scholars in-
sisted on their formal approach to law’s requirements.112 
The first serious assault on the idea of a symmetry of constitu-
tional and international law occurred with the Gulf War.113  The aca-
demic argument over the Gulf War was not commensurate with the 
                                                                                                                                      
war . . . and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another.”  Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 
reprinted in MANLEY O. HUDSON, BY PACIFIC MEANS: THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF ARTICLE TWO OF THE PACT OF PARIS 154 (1935).  Article 2 of the Pact 
states that the settlement of disputes will only be “by pacific means.”  Id.  Hud-
son, like many jurists of his time, regarded Article 2 as not “a mere expression 
of pious hope” but as a “compulsive force of international law.”  Id. at 93. 
 109. See KOH, supra note 39, at 131-33. 
 110. See id. at 126-28. 
 111. In large part they declined because Congress itself was divided over its 
role.  See generally MARTIN S. SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (1999) (stating that in times of necessity, Con-
gress will draw upon its war powers to give the president authority to act in de-
fense of the United States). 
 112. The Owl of Minerva of this position is John Ely’s book on Vietnam, 
which, though a generation too late, perfectly expresses the academic mentality 
of the time.  See ELY, supra note 31. 
 113. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 
“The Old Order Changeth”, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63 (1991); Michael J. Glen-
non, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 74 (1991). 
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underlying issue of that conflict.  After all, Iraq had invaded and an-
nexed Kuwait.  Nothing quite like this had occurred in the postwar 
era.  The action fell squarely under Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the 
use of force, just as the use of force in response fell squarely within 
the norm of collective self-defense.  Procedurally as well, the war 
met the academics’ conditions of legitimacy—it was approved by 
both the Security Council and by Congress.114 
Nevertheless, the war occasioned a substantial debate over the 
relationship of these institutions.  Could the president commit 
American forces to a Security Council approved action in the ab-
sence of congressional approval?  Did the constitutional requirement 
of a congressional declaration of war extend to American participa-
tion in multilateral enforcement actions authorized by the Security 
Council?  The reason for the debate was not hard to find:  this was 
the first post-Cold War war.  The stalemate in the Security Council 
had been breached, and this raised entirely new possibilities.  To re-
alize these possibilities, however, required confronting the asymme-
try between the constitutional order and the emerging order of inter-
national law. 
One of the unanticipated benefits of the Cold War had been the 
dramatic development of a formal law of human rights.115  If the Se-
curity Council were to take up these contemporary international law 
norms as the ground for a post-Cold War agenda, there would be a 
radical reconstruction of the ideas of state sovereignty, government 
 
 114. For a review of the history of authorization, see J. Gregory Sidak, To 
Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 29-31 (1991).  There is ambiguity over 
whether the Persian Gulf War was authorized under Article 51.  Article 51 ap-
pears to subject the right of self-defense to superseding Security Council action 
by recognizing the right of self-defense “until the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”  U.N. 
CHARTER art. 51. 
  Whether the right of self-defense exists even after the Security Council 
has acted is a matter of academic debate.  See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The 
Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Action, 17 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 229 (1995); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or 
Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 506 (1991); Roger D. Scott, Get-
ting Back to the Real United Nations: Global Peace Norms and Creeping In-
terventionism, 154 MIL. L. REV. 27, 52 (1997). 
 115. See supra Part IV. 
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autonomy, domestic jurisdiction, and indeed of the very nature of an 
international rule of law.  Suddenly, international law scholars could 
imagine a Security Council pursuing an agenda informed by a truly 
transnational perspective.  The center of gravity of the international 
legal order was shifting from Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of 
force to a regime of international human rights. 
Were the Council to adopt such a program of enforcing an inter-
national law of human rights, an emphasis on Congress’s war-
declaring power could amount to a serious, and possibly fatal, 
institutional barrier.  It would impose on the Council the burden of 
the American division of power between Congress and president.  
The president would be disabled from committing the United States 
to participate in “enforcement actions.”  Without the United States, 
the Security Council was likely to do little.  Holding Security 
Council action hostage to the United States Congress would be a 
prescription for failure of the emerging vision of an enforceable, 
transnational order of human rights. 
By 1991, there was substantial reason to believe that the Secu-
rity Council might become an enthusiastic supporter of such interna-
tional norms.  Indeed, through the following years this is exactly 
what we have seen.  The Security Council has repeatedly intervened 
in order to protect human rights.  It intervened to manage transitions 
away from authoritarian regimes in Haiti, El Salvador, Angola, and 
Cambodia.116  It deployed forces, or authorized such deployments, in 
 
 116. For a selection of relevant Security Council Resolutions, see the follow-
ing:  S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/841 (1993); S.C. Res. 1048, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3638th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1048 (1996); S.C. Res. 1063, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3676th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1063 (1996); S.C. Res. 1123, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 
3806th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1123 (1997); and S.C. Res. 1141, U.N. SCOR, 
52d Sess., 3837th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1141 (1997) (on Haiti); S.C. Res. 
673, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2949th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/673 (1990); S.C. 
Res. 714, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3010th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/714 (1991); 
S.C. Res. 961, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3465th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/961 
(1994); S.C. Res. 991, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3528th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/991 (1995) (on El Salvador); S.C. Res. 696, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 
2991st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/696 (1991); and S.C. Res. 1055, U.N. SCOR, 
51st Sess., 3662d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1055 (1996) (on Angola).  For a 
good account of UNTAC’s mission on Cambodia, refer to MICHAEL W. 
DOYLE, U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA: UNTAC’S CIVIL MANDATE 
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Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq.117  The reason for 
these interventions has not been the protection of states from viola-
tions of Article 2(4).  Rather, these have been actions to defend the 
human rights of citizens against repressive domestic regimes.  These 
interventions would have been inconceivable a generation earlier, ei-
ther because the sites of intervention fell within the spheres of influ-
ence of the superpowers, or because the situations would have been 
actively contested by the superpowers. 
During this same period, i.e., up until the intervention in Kos-
ovo, no American ground forces were placed at serious military risk 
outside of such Security Council authorized actions.118  There could 
not have been a sharper sign of the end of the Cold War.  American 
forces were effectively becoming an element—the most important 
element—of a multilateral approach, acting under the authority of the 
Security Council and pursuing a human rights agenda. 
During the 1990s, a practice developed of American participa-
tion in such UN approved missions.  Most obviously, there has been 
a substantial deployment of American military forces in Bosnia as a 
result of the Dayton Peace agreements, and there has been a continu-
ing deployment of American forces “policing” the Iraqi no-fly 
zones.119  American troops participated disastrously in Somalia and 
                                                                                                                                      
(1995). 
 117. See, e.g., Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Re-
sponsibility: War Powers in the Postwar Era, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 145 
(1995). 
 118. Since 1990, the United States has committed ground troops five times, 
all with Security Council authorization:  in Iraq (Desert Storm), Haiti, Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo.  See id. at 145 n.2.  There are a number of instances, 
however, where the United States has conducted bombing without specific Se-
curity Council authorization, including the 1993 bombing of Iraq in response 
to the assassination attempt on George Bush, and the 1998 strikes against Iraq 
for its failure to comply with UNSCOM.  The United States also sent missiles 
into Sudan and Afghanistan without Security Council authorization.  See Jules 
Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 1 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 19, 34-35 (2000). 
 119. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/819 (1993); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); and S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) authorized the deployment of troops fol-
lowing the Dayton Peace Agreements.  The American policing of the no-fly 
zone in Iraq is pursuant to S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., 
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with mixed success in Haiti.  Despite party differences, Congress al-
lowed the President to take the political responsibility for these poli-
cies.  Its typical action has been neither to support nor to prohibit the 
policy, but to declare its support for American forces and to provide 
appropriations.120 
The emerging rule of the 1990s seemed to be that the president 
could commit American forces to participate in duly authorized en-
forcement actions by the Security Council.121  Congress did not act to 
prevent such engagements; it did not insist on prior approval, and it 
did not press claims under the War Powers Resolution.  Congres-
sional acquiescence to American participation in such enforcement 
actions signified a shift in the constitutional baseline from which the 
use of force was measured.  It was no longer plausible to argue that 
every substantial use of force fell within Congress’s war-declaring 
authority.  The War Powers Resolution was dying a quiet death. 
As of 1998, arguably there had been an adjustment of constitu-
tional magnitude in the manner in which American political institu-
tions intersected with the global regime of law.  United States forces 
were now regular elements in international police forces deployed 
under the authority of the Security Council.  Such deployments did 
not fall within the traditional category of war, and were, therefore, 
not subject to a requirement of prior congressional authorization.122  
The president’s duty to execute the law had expanded to include the 
international legal order.123  That order was no longer about the pro-
tection of state sovereignty, but about the advancement of human 
rights.  The effective check on the abuse of force would come from 
the Security Council, not Congress.  Congress, of course, retains an 
ultimate authority to prohibit American participation in such police 
actions.  It can deny funding and it has the power to issue regulations 
                                                                                                                                      
U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). 
 120. See Andrew K. Schiff, The War Power Resolution: From the Halls of 
Congress to the Hills of Bosnia, Inertia Should Give Way to Post Cold-War 
Reality, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 877, 880-84 (1996). 
 121. See Franck & Patel, supra note 113, at 74. 
 122. See Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the 
Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 111-17 (1995). 
 123. See generally Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound By International 
Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1987) (explaining the president’s constitutional 
authority and obligation to faithfully execute international law). 
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on the use of the armed forces. 
The intervention in Kosovo, however, went well beyond this 
emerging institutional practice.  The military action in Kosovo was 
not an enforcement action approved by the Security Council; it was 
not a police action under Chapter Seven of the Charter.  Nor did it fit 
within the traditional norm of collective self-defense, which applies 
to cross-border transgressions.  This was a humanitarian intervention 
by NATO, acting under the leadership of the United States.  This was 
not just another post-Cold War UN authorized action; it was effec-
tively the first post-Charter action.  In this sense, it burst the parame-
ters of the balance of domestic and international institutions that had 
been reached in the course of the 1990s.  While Congress may have 
adjusted to a situation in which its war declaring functions were no 
longer applicable to police actions pursuant to Security Council au-
thorizations, there were no grounds to believe it had acquiesced to 
executive decisions to deploy force outside of the UN framework.124 
For those international law scholars that grew up in the era of 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama, the interven-
tion in Kosovo fit into a familiar pattern.  Once again, the United 
States was intervening militarily in the domestic politics of a sover-
eign state.  Once again, the U.S. intervention lacked the approval of 
the Security Council, and once again the intervention was fundamen-
tally an Executive decision—that is, Congress had not passed a dec-
laration of war.  Indeed, the effort to pass a resolution supporting the 
action failed on a tie vote in the House.125  Instead of American pres-
tige and power being at stake in Latin America or Southeast Asia, it 
was now at stake in Eastern Europe.  That this area was now incorpo-
rated into our zone of vital national interests was a function of Cold 
War developments, i.e., the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.  Yet, 
 
 124. Nor does citation to the NATO Charter help in this regard.  For fifty 
years, NATO had been an organization of collective self-defense, operating 
within the parameters of Article 51 of the UN Charter.  The Kosovo interven-
tion was not action in self-defense.  NATO may have assumed a new institu-
tional role, but legal grounds for that change are no easier to discern. 
 125. See S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999) (authorizing the president of 
the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).  The resolution failed by the vote 213-
213. 
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the pattern was as old as the Monroe Doctrine:  we were once again 
setting out to control political developments within our unilaterally 
declared sphere of influence.  As in the past, we had the support of 
reluctant allies, providing a patina of internationalism for what was 
essentially a United States’ action. 
Judged by the postwar standards of Charter law, these scholars 
were right to see the Kosovo intervention as illegal.  Previous unilat-
eral claims of humanitarian intervention, when pursued beyond 
short-term rescue missions, had met with skepticism.126  If illegal 
under international law, there could be little argument that the presi-
dent had the power to commit American forces without congres-
sional approval—and surely he could have no such power after the 
“grace period” of the War Powers Resolution had run. 
Nevertheless, the legal rhetoric from the Cold War was strik-
ingly out of place in the discussion of the Kosovo intervention.  The 
threat to the international order could not reasonably be seen as aris-
ing from the NATO intervention, unless one had an inordinate fear of 
the Russian response.  Rather, the threat came from the policies of 
the Milosevic regime.  Cold War categories no longer described the 
reality of the politics of intervention, and therefore those categories 
did not offer any obvious direction for legal analysis. 
There is little doubt that the intervention in Kosovo had as its 
basis a concern for human rights.  There was no good reason for the 
intervention from the perspective of national self-interest.  It repre-
sented a substantial political risk, with little direct domestic benefit.  
Of course, arguments can be made that the defense of human rights 
and regional political stability are in the long-term interests of the 
United States.  But if those are the national interests, then the Cold 
War is quite dead and national security interests are now aligned 
with global human rights interests.  The difficulty for the critics, 
then, was that the human rights motives of this intervention were 
visible on their face; it was not credible to argue that they were a pre-
text for some other set of motives.  To apply the Cold War law on the 
 
 126. See STEPHEN A. GARETT, DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL: AN 
EXAMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1999); A. MARK 
WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II 
(1997). 
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use of force now appeared to be a kind of category mistake.  This 
was not an extension of the Reagan Doctrine to Eastern Europe, and 
it was not a “humanitarian” intervention like that of India in East 
Pakistan. 
This does not mean that the reasons for the intervention were 
simply the advancement of human rights, as if military interventions 
can now be expected wherever human rights are challenged.  How 
NATO got to the position of intervening to defend these interests in 
this case is a different story.  That is a complex history of previous 
failures in Bosnia, of diplomatic frustration, and of the forces of pub-
lic opinion generated by media access.  We should not, however, 
confuse this account of “why here” with the separate question of the 
end for which intervention occurred.  That domestic politics supports 
an international human rights end does not somehow “taint” the end. 
Neither does it challenge that end to argue that the outcome has 
been deficient when measured against those same rights:  the return-
ing Kosovars have committed their own violations of the rights of 
the Serbs.  But the lack of success in this respect does not suggest 
that the end of the intervention was “really” the same as the ends of 
those who benefited from the intervention.  NATO intervened to pro-
tect the human rights of those who had a political agenda that the 
interveners did not support:  independence for Kosovo.  This dis-
agreement has continued with mixed policy results.127  Yet it is a fa-
miliar lesson from domestic civil rights law that human rights often 
count the most when we act to protect the rights of those with whom 
we disagree. 
In just ten years, we have learned that the institutional structure 
of the Charter is not adequate for the advancement of this new, sub-
stantive, international legal order of human rights.  We find ourselves 
with a Cold War structure in a post-Cold War world.  This mismatch 
between institutions and law was bound to come to a crisis point 
when the global regime of human rights intersected too closely with 
 
 127. See Milo Branic, Politics-Yugoslavia: Two Divergent Views of “Collat-
eral Damage”, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 27, 2000; Allan Massie, Only Way 
to Repair the Balkan Damage, THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 28, 2000, at 14; Betsy 
Pisik, Clinton Pushes for More Robust U.N. Peace Force, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 
8, 2000, at A12. 
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the remnants of the Cold War system of alliances and spheres of in-
fluence.  This is what happened in Kosovo.  NATO intervened with-
out seeking Security Council approval because there was no possibil-
ity that such approval would be forthcoming.  Russia, a traditional 
ally of the Serbs, would have vetoed any such effort.  That the 
United States was willing to risk its relationship with Russia through 
such an intervention deep into its traditional sphere of influence—
and unexpectedly risk its relationship to China as well—is just an-
other mark of how far we have come from the Cold War. 
Kosovo, however, did not become a Russian Cuban Missile Cri-
sis.  Intervention in the defense of human rights does not pose the 
same sort of threat as the Cold War interventions.  International law 
no longer serves to protect state sovereignty as if that is the only bar-
rier to an anarchical return to a state of nature.  Contemporary inter-
national law mitigates claims of state sovereignty by marking the 
point at which those outside the community have a right to express 
concern and even a responsibility to take action to assure that the 
human rights of individuals are respected. 
By the time of the Gulf War, the war declaring power of Con-
gress was effectively being challenged by an emerging global legal 
order in which the use of force was managed by the Security Coun-
cil.  By the time of Kosovo, the emerging law of human rights had 
become sufficiently strong to stand on its own.  That law could now 
serve as a standard by which to measure the performance of interna-
tional, as well as domestic, institutions.  By that standard, the Secu-
rity Council had failed in Kosovo.128  The NATO intervention was, 
in this sense, corrective:  it remedied not just the substantive viola-
tion of law by the Milosevic regime, but also the institutional failure 
of the Security Council. 
That this corrective action was effective is suggested by the sub-
sequent adoption of responsibility for administering and policing the 
 
 128. See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards 
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the 
World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (1999); see also Ved P. Naada et 
al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia—Revisiting 
the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 26 DENV. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827, 865-66 (1998) (arguing that the UN should have pri-
mary jurisdiction over intervention in humanitarian crises). 
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situation in Kosovo by the Security Council.129  That the corrective 
may have had some lasting effect became clear in the Council’s rela-
tively rapid reaction to the situation in East Timor, following the vote 
for independence.130  While the Council was arguably negligent in 
failing to anticipate the possibility of a violent reaction to the refer-
endum, it was able to respond forcefully to the situation as it devel-
oped.  This is undoubtedly a legacy of Kosovo. 
The Security Council structure represents an antiquated distribu-
tion of power.  Nevertheless, it is not likely to change any time soon:  
the Charter amendment procedure poses too many obstacles.131  
Thus, we find ourselves with a mismatch between a global order of 
international human rights that has developed in the last generation, 
and an institution designed to deal with an international legal order in 
which state sovereignty was central.  That this mismatch did not 
wholly stymie the development of a law of human rights was itself 
remarkable:  more a matter of luck than design.132  Nevertheless, we 
should expect more occasions in which the institution and the law 
simply do not match. 
The best the law can do in such situations is nothing at all.  
There is no reason to defend a partially antiquated institution at a 
 
 129. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (1999). 
 130. See S.C. Res. 1262, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4038th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1262 (1999); S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999); S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 
4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999). 
 131. Despite a working group and long debates on the issue, any prospects 
for reform are stymied by the lack of consensus among states as to what type 
of reform should occur and the requirement that any Charter amendment re-
ceive approval by “two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly . . . in-
cluding all the permanent members of the Security Council.”  U.N. CHARTER 
art. 108.  See generally BARDO FASSBENDER, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
REFORM AND THE RIGHT TO VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998) 
(describing obstacles posed by the veto); David D. Caron, Strengthening the 
Collective Authority of the Security Council, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 87TH ANNUAL MEETING, MARCH 
31-APRIL 3, 1993, at 303, 306-08 (1993) (describing the obstacles created by 
the differences in capabilities between delegations, the veto, and the size of the 
Security Council). 
 132. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
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substantial cost to individuals and groups.  The institution of the Se-
curity Council is not a good in itself; neither, for that matter, is Con-
gress.  Each must be measured in terms of the ends of a legal order, 
which now include both human rights and democratic legitimacy.  
By these measures, neither the Security Council nor Congress always 
comes out well. 
Just as we should not fetishize our institutions, we should not 
freely encourage independent enforcement action by states when 
there is still a danger of pretextual claims.  The global order of hu-
man rights has hardly displaced traditional state interests across the 
board.  We are only at the beginning of such a world of rights.  There 
is no rule to be formulated because every situation will call forth dif-
ferent kinds of reactions.  Just as Congress has frequently authorized 
presidential deployments of force after the fact, the same may be true 
of the Security Council.  Post-hoc authorization may be the best 
measure we have of the legality of a humanitarian intervention. 
In the end, we must decide for ourselves whether a use of force 
is really dedicated to the pursuit of a global order of human rights or 
is only a military intervention of the old style in pursuit of national 
interests.  If it is the latter, it deserves to be condemned.  But it 
should be condemned for what it is substantively, not for a failure to 
follow an antiquated arrangement or to subordinate normative ends 
 
to an international institutional arrangement that is itself of question-
able legitimacy. 
The real problem today is not a surfeit of questionable humani-
tarian interventions, but the failure to take up this task in many 
places in the world.  This has been the story, most evidently, in much 
of Africa.  In the face of gross violations of human rights around the 
world, I can think of no reason to set law against any effort that 
promises substantial amelioration.  While the law alone cannot stop 
states from the military pursuit of their vital national interests—as 
they understand them—it can have some effect on a state’s willing-
ness to pursue genuine humanitarian interventions.  States reluctantly 
intervene on such grounds; to be told it is illegal would only increase 
the burden. 
 
58 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:11 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The great project at the beginning of the new millennium is the 
dissolution of the state system and the emergence of a global order of 
law founded on the idea of human rights.  This is a most uncertain 
project normatively and institutionally.  The age of states was only in 
part a disaster:  along with endless wars, it brought us a system of ul-
timate meanings by which generations defined a life project.  
Whether a vision of human rights can provide ultimate meanings is 
an open question.  For the United States, in particular, transition to a 
new age of a global regime of rights will be the hardest of all. 
Americans understand the rule of law as the political order es-
tablished by the Constitution and maintained by domestic courts.  
The Constitution expresses the will of the popular sovereign, and the 
courts speak in the voice of the people even when they declare popu-
larly supported legislation to be unconstitutional.133  But the rest of 
the world increasingly understands the rule of law as a global order 
of human rights.  The existence of these legal rights is quite inde-
pendent of the idea of popular sovereignty.  For us, sovereignty is the 
source of law; for others, law precedes and limits sovereignty.  Be-
cause we locate law within a functional account of popular sover-
eignty, we are by instinct extremely reluctant to recognize any “le-
gal” space for a nondomestic court.  For us, law is not a matter for 
“neutral” experts; rather, it is deeply political.  Political not in the 
sense of factional, but in the sense that it is constitutive of a national 
identity.  International law, perhaps for us alone in the Western 
world, threatens our deepest sense of political identity. 
The American conception of law’s rule fit well within the inter-
national law of the Cold War.  The international law of state sover-
eignty protected every national political community from forceful in-
tervention by others.  State sovereignty and self-determination under 
international law were understood primarily in a territorial fashion:  
within its borders, each state was substantially free to work out its 
own political identity.  Our identity has been linked to our concep-
tion of law, but it is a fundamental mistake to think that our domestic 
deification of law’s rule should make us receptive to an international 
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rule of human rights law. 
The United States was the first modern state, forming itself un-
der a constitutional ideal of democracy and law.  It is the country 
most deeply committed to an idea of itself as a sovereign entity under 
law.  And it is the most spectacularly successful state in all of mod-
ern history.  Only in the United States is the view deeply held that we 
have no need of the new global order of law:  we have no such need 
because our nationalism has been a nationalism of rights under law 
for 200 years.  This view puts American lawyers, judges, politicians, 
and academics outside of the most important global project of law.  
Americans are increasingly bystanders in an emerging discourse of 
international human rights.  Only in the United States is this dis-
course of international human rights marginalized in our political in-
stitutions.  Only in our domestic courts are there so few places at 
which the international law of human rights can even get a foothold 
from which to make cognizable arguments.134 
We confront two different legal orders today, one constitutional 
and one international.  Both are actually in great flux as they try to 
adjust to each other.  Every political instinct that we have will work 
against participation in a new global order of law.  Ironically, our 
substantive understanding of law—of the rights a liberal legal regime 
must protect—is not significantly out of step with the emerging 
global order.  There is no reason why it should be, since the United 
States has often served as the model of a successful regime under 
law.  But our understanding of the sources of law is deeply inconsis-
tent with this emerging order.  It is not likely that we will soon sub-
stitute the international Covenant for Civil and Political Rights for 
the Bill of Rights.  That the American adjudication of rights would 
care deeply about the views of the Framers, who have been gone for 
200 years, and not at all about international covenants to which the 
United States is a party, is not just a deeply puzzling position to 
 
 134. See Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952) (con-
cluding that human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter are non-
self-executing); Alfred T. Goodwin, International Law in the Federal Courts, 
20 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 157, 162 (1990) (arguing that “while the courts almost 
daily confront issues . . . involving human rights . . . [they] have been slow to 
incorporate international human rights law into domestic jurisprudence”). 
 
60 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:11 
 
 
judges and academics elsewhere—to them it is simply irrational. 
To attempt to reinvigorate Congress’s war declaring role would 
only exacerbate this problem of incongruity.  It would be an act of 
international irresponsibility framed as a matter of constitutional re-
sponsibility.  Here, the courts have paved the way for a quiet aban-
donment.  Congress’s war powers have not been judicially enforce-
able; it would be a disaster were they to become so.  We do not need 
eighteenth century solutions to twenty-first century problems. 
